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Health  shocks  are  among  the  most  important  unprotected  risks  for microﬁnance  clients,
but take-up  of micro  health  insurance  remains  low.  A framed  ﬁeld  experiment  with  credit
groups  in Tanzania,  eliciting  demand  for  group  versus  individual  insurance,  attributes  this
to a social  dilemma.  In a context  of  joint  liability,  insurance  is a public  good  because  clients
can rely  on  contributions  from  group  members  to cope  with  health  shocks.  We  hypothesize
that  clients  have  a private  incentive  to free-ride  and  forgo  individual  insurance  even  when
full  enrollment  optimizes  group  welfare.  The  binding  nature  of  group  insurance  eliminates
such  free-riding.  Our  experiment  yields  substantial  support  for this  hypothesis.  Whereas
the demand  for  group  insurance  is high,  a substantial  share  of  clients  forgoes  individual
insurance  and  relies  on  peers  to repay  their  loan  when  falling  ill.  Group  insurance  can
potentially  increase  low  take-up  rates.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
Households in developing countries face tremendous health risk but lack access to formal health insurance (Gertler and
ruber, 2002). High transactions costs, information asymmetries and a lack of trust prevent private insurance providers from
overing the poor. Moreover, high degrees of labor informality and weak institutions hamper solutions adopted in developed
ountries, such as tax-ﬁnanced public health care, social health insurance, mandatory enrollment, or employer-provided
roup insurance (Zweifel et al., 2009). Many developing countries therefore resort to introducing voluntary health insurance,
ften via microﬁnance institutions (MFIs). Despite premiums typically being highly subsidized and below actuarially fair
evels, take-up of micro health insurance remains low (Acharya et al., 2012).This paper argues that low demand for health insurance is partly due to a social dilemma. Without insurance, the poor
ely on contributions from their social network to ﬁnance catastrophic health expenditures. MFIs institutionalize such risk
haring by lending to jointly liable groups in which access to future loans is conditioned on full group repayment. This
reates incentives to help fellow group members repay their loan in the face of illness or other ﬁnancial disaster (Aghion
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 2026274364.
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et al., 2000).1 Contributions however provide incomplete insurance since the group may  not share risk beyond repayment of
the loan. Insurance that covers the full risk can hence be welfare-enhancing. At the same time, precisely because part of the
health risk is shared within the credit group, members may  free-ride on others and decide not to enroll in formal insurance.
Using a framed ﬁeld experiment with 355 clients from an MFI  in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, we  test whether demand for
health insurance is indeed subject to a social dilemma. Participants played a public goods game framed as health insurance
decisions in jointly liable credit groups. Depending on treatment, they were offered insurance at either the individual or
group level. Group insurance requires a unanimous decision to enroll and commits group members to jointly take insur-
ance if full group enrollment optimizes group welfare.2 Individual insurance allows clients to opt in or out of insurance
independent of their group members. Non-cooperative game theory predicts that only sufﬁciently risk averse clients coop-
erate on the social optimum by enrolling in individual insurance. Less risk averse clients are tempted to forgo individual
insurance, even if full group enrollment optimizes group welfare, because they can rely on peers’ assistance when falling
ill.
Empirically, free-riding is not a trivial outcome in a microcredit context. On the one hand, experimental studies on project
choice in microﬁnance groups ﬁnd that individuals make riskier investment choices under joint liability – when they can
free-ride on peers – compared to individual liability, even when this harms group welfare (e.g. Giné et al., 2010). On the
other hand, microﬁnance groups are long-term relationships with repeated interactions. The threat of future retaliation,
social ties and interactions within credit groups may  well induce cooperative behavior (Bó, 2005; Abbink et al., 2006; Cassar
et al., 2007). In other words, joint liability can encourage borrowers to take excessive risks and free-ride on peers, or lead to
cooperation and safer choices, including the choice to take health insurance.
Our ﬁndings provide substantial evidence of free-riding. Under group insurance, nearly all participants opt for insurance,
indicating that insurance optimizes group welfare. Under individual insurance, demand is high only among more risk averse
clients. A large number of less risk averse clients forgoes individual insurance and free-rides on contributions from their
peers. We conclude that mechanisms through which joint liability may  lead to safer choices in microﬁnance groups do not
rule out free-riding in health insurance decisions. Group insurance aligns individual and group incentives and can thereby
help microﬁnance groups coordinate on their social optimum.
This study contributes to the existing literature in three distinctive ways. First, we  extend the literature on joint liability
and strategic investment behavior (e.g. Stiglitz, 1990; Giné et al., 2010; Fischer, 2013). Unlike prior experiments, we  do
not analyze project choice under individual versus joint liability. Instead, we  take the joint liability context as given, and
identify free-riding by comparing choices with and without binding group agreement. Further, our task is framed as a health
insurance choice, which may  invoke a different set of norms than business investments.
Second, we add to an emerging literature on how informal risk-sharing can hamper demand for formal insurance. Inde-
pendently, De Janvry et al. (2014) and Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2015) also refer to free-riding problems to explain low
insurance take-up. Using game theory, De Janvry et al. show that low demand for rainfall insurance in cooperatives is poten-
tially due to free-riding and coordination failures among members. Mobarak and Rosenzweig use observational data to
investigate whether informal risk-sharing in caste groups reduces demand for formal weather insurance. In the controlled
environment of the lab, we can identify free-riding separately from coordination failures. Moreover, we focus on insurance
against idiosyncratic health shocks instead of co-variate weather shocks.
Third, the study provides insights on linking microﬁnance with health-related services. Such linkages hold real promise,
but to date, few studies assess the potential of bundling credit and insurance to improve health seeking behavior (Leatherman
et al., 2012). Exceptions are Ahmed et al. (2006), who  show that free health services, including health ﬁnancing, improve
health-seeking behavior in a microcredit context; Blanchard-Horan (2007), who ﬁnd smaller delays in seeking treatment for
malaria among insured microcredit clients than among uninsured clients; and Banerjee et al. (2014), who  provide evidence
of clients dropping out from the MFI  when loans are bundled with mandatory health insurance.
Our study thereby highlights a crucial advantage of voluntary group insurance contracts in a microﬁnance setting. Group
insurance does not only limit adverse selection, as has been widely investigated for employer-based insurance (Browne,
1992; McGuire, 2012), but also increases take-up by eliminating free-riding on others’ contributions. Further, the voluntary
nature of group insurance reduces the risk of clients dropping out when bundling credit and insurance. This is relevant for
numerous microinsurance programs struggling to increase enrollment and limit adverse selection.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the experiment. Section 3 discusses our
main hypotheses and classiﬁes less versus more risk averse participants. Section 4 tests for free-riding in insurance decisions.
The ﬁnal section concludes.1 Joint liability also serves to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard, and enforce repayments (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). Although major micro-
ﬁnance institutes have moved to individual liability (Baland et al., 2013), joint liability still features 26 and 20 percent of total loans in Africa and the rest of
the  developing world, respectively (Beck and Cull, 2013). Further, individually liable clients can operate as a group and support delinquent group members
(Feigenberg et al., 2013).
2 This paper deﬁnes group insurance by the restriction that all members need to enroll in order to be offered a formal insurance contract. By contrast, the
literature on informal risk-sharing sometimes refers to group insurance as risk-pooling within groups (see e.g. Paal and Wiseman, 2011), i.e. joint liability
in  our case.
22
e
s
2
a
t
p
i
w
m
d
c
l
F
l
t
d
ﬁ
tW.  Janssens, B. Kramer / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 131 (2016) 47–61 49
. Methods
.1. Design
To test whether free-riding reduces demand for insurance in jointly liable credit groups, we  conducted a framed ﬁeld
xperiment with 355 clients from Tujijenge Tanzania Ltd., an MFI  in Dar es Salaam, the largest city in Tanzania. Tujijenge
tarted providing microcredit in 2006 and was considering to also offer health insurance at the time of the experiment in
011. At that point, the MFI  had approximately 12,800 members engaged in group lending schemes. Clients borrowed on
verage 450,000 Tanzanian Shillings (US $ 300) and paid 12 percent interest per loan cycle of three months. Groups of ﬁve
o seven members were jointly liable for repayment. Appendix Table A1 (see the online supplement) describes the subject
ool in more detail.
Panel (a) of Fig. 1 provides an overview of the experiment. Participants ﬁrst played basic microinsurance games with
ndividual liability. We  use insurance choices in these games to classify their risk aversion type. In these games, all participants
ere offered individual insurance and communication was  not possible. Next, they were randomly assigned to groups of 5
icrocredit clients, to play a public goods game framed as health insurance decisions in a context of joint liability. We  use
emand for insurance in this game to test for free-riding.
Groups played this main game for a large, unknown number of rounds (loan cycles). Every loan cycle, group members
ould fall ill and incur health expenditures, precluding them from repaying their loan. In order to avoid group default, jointly
iable group members had to contribute towards loan repayment of these so-called delinquent peers. Groups with too many
ig. 1. Experimental methods. Notes: The left-hand side describes income after repayment and is the same for both introductory games with individual
iability and the main game with joint liability. Under joint liability, groups contribute to loan repayment for delinquent members who are unable to repay
hemselves. The right-hand side describes the ﬁnal payoff after contributing for delinquent group members, with Ft and Vi,t+1 indicating the number of
elinquents in the group and a client’s continuation value from future loan cycles, respectively. The value under individual liability (not shown in the
gure) is u(22, 500) + Vi,t+1 if uninsured and healthy, u(0) if uninsured and ill, and u(10, 000) + Vi,t+1 if insured, with Vi,t+1 = 0 in the second and last round of
he  individual liability game.
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delinquents could not fully repay, defaulted, and could no longer borrow. They earned zero from future loan cycles. Group
members decided simultaneously and in private whether to eliminate the health risk by buying health insurance. Insurance
reduced both the need for contributions from peers and the group default risk, making it a public good.
In this main game with joint liability, treatments varied between subjects in two dimensions. First, groups were offered
either individual insurance (II) or group insurance (GI). Under individual insurance, clients could join insurance independent
of their peers’ decisions. Thus, uninsured ill clients could free-ride on insured peers’ contributions to their loan repayment.
Under group insurance, a group enrolled if and only if all 5 clients preferred to enroll. Without unanimity, nobody enrolled
nor paid the insurance premium. This rules out free-riding, revealing whether individuals prefer full over zero enrollment
in a context with joint liability.
The experiment also varied the possibility to communicate. In treatments without communication (II-NC and GI-NC),
clients did not talk to other participants. In the communication treatments (II-C and GI-C), group members talked for two
minutes preceding every round, to identify whether verbal interactions prior to insurance decisions limit free-riding.
Treatments varied by session. We  organized in total six individual and eight group insurance sessions, respectively, half
of them including communication. On average, 25 clients participated in a session, and each client participated in only one
session, and hence one treatment.
2.2. Experimental tasks
Panel (b) of Fig. 1 visualizes the experimental tasks. The left-hand side indicates income after loan repayment in the
ﬁrst introductory game without joint liability. A participant borrowed 40,000 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS; 26.67 USD) and
invested this loan, yielding a revenue of 62,500. A participant was healthy with probability 4/5. Healthy participants were
able to repay their loan, and earned 22,500 after loan repayment. However, a participant fell ill with probability 1/5.3 Ill
participants incurred health expenditures equal to 62,500, which fully absorbed earnings before loan repayment. As a result,
they did not repay their loan and received zero income. Prior to every loan cycle, clients could enroll in health insurance that
fully covered the 62,500 health expenditures at an actuarially fair premium of 12,500. An insured client paid the insurance
premium, repaid the loan, and received 10,000 with certainty, irrespective of health status.
This game was played for two rounds, and a participant moved to the second round only if she repaid the ﬁrst loan. The
game served to familiarize participants with the basic rules of the microinsurance games, including dynamic incentives to
repay the loan and take insurance. As a robustness check, participants also played a second game with individual liability
and individual insurance, again with two rounds, in which we  increased the insurance premium to 17,500.
Next, in groups of 5 clients – a common group size for the microﬁnance population targeted by our experiment – partic-
ipants played the same game but now with joint liability and for a larger number of rounds. In this game, group members
contributed to the extent possible for delinquent peers who  could not repay their share of the loan, and defaulting groups
did not continue to the next loan cycle.
The right-hand side of Panel (b), which only applies to the main game with joint liability, describes the value after
contributing for delinquent peers. We  denote Ft as the number of delinquent group members, u(·) as utility from the current
round, and Vi,t+1 as total expected utility from future loan cycles, i.e. the value from continuing to the next loan cycle. If all
group members could repay, Ft = 0, group members kept their earnings after loan repayment. If one group member could not
repay, Ft = 1, her four repaying peers (both insured and uninsured) each contributed 10,000. In both cases, the group fully
repaid and continued to the next loan cycle.
By contrast, if more than one group member could not repay, Ft > 1, the remaining group members’ disposable income
was insufﬁcient to contribute at least 80,000, which is the minimum contribution required in groups with at least two
delinquents. In that case, the group defaulted, repaid as much as it could afford, and the bank stopped lending to the entire
group. After contributing, proﬁts were zero for all members and the game ended.
The game was designed to resemble microcredit clients’ decision-making context as closely as possible, but abstracted
from reality in a few ways. First, the model focuses on catastrophic health expenditures. We  abstract from minor illnesses and
injuries because transaction costs for insuring minor health risks are high relative to the insured amount. Existing insurance
schemes hence mostly cover catastrophic health shocks. Moreover, households are less likely to rely on informal support
from their social network for minor health risks. Conditional on reporting health problems, only 4.8 percent of our target
populations uses support from others when health costs compared to monthly per capita income are in the lowest quintile,
4compared to 22.8 percent in the highest quintile. Since we test whether risk-sharing creates a social dilemma in the take-up
of health insurance, we focus on catastrophic health shocks, where risk-sharing is most prevalent.
Second, a participant could only use current income, not savings from past earnings, to repay her loan or contribute for
delinquent peers. Thus, we abstract from self-insurance as a risk-coping tool. In reality, clients often use savings to pay for
3 We focus on IID shocks and abstract from adverse selection (heterogeneity in the health shock probability), epidemics (cross-sectional correlation)
or  chronic illness (serial correlation). Our predictions are robust to heterogeneous risks for a wide range of parameters. Homogeneity in risk can also be
interpreted as assortative matching on health.
4 Source: Survey of a representative sample of clients from the partnering MFI, carried out for the Health Insurance Fund by TNS Research International
in  November 2010.
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oth minor and major medical bills (20.6 and 38.6 percent for clients in the quintile with the lowest and highest health
xpenditure-income ratio, respectively). By contrast, as health expenditures increase, self-insurance becomes insufﬁcient
o cover expenditures and contributions from the social network become increasingly important (Appendix Fig. A1). We
ence focus on risk-sharing, which is unique to the catastrophic health risks that insurance providers attempt to cover.
Third, when total income in the group is insufﬁcient to contribute for delinquent peers, clients contribute as much as
hey can, namely their current income. Such partial loan repayment rules out the possibility of proﬁtable strategic defaults.
n settings where group lending has been introduced successfully, microﬁnance clients rarely default strategically as a group
in our target population, 98 percent of clients repay their full loan). This can be explained by several factors (Armendariz
nd Morduch, 2010). Clients may  for instance have compulsory savings with the bank, or fear pressure and harassment from
oan ofﬁcers.
Fourth, when able to repay jointly, the group contributes the required amount for delinquents and repays the full loan.
hile the game does not include a discretionary contribution decision, participants would have dynamic incentives to
ontribute a similar amount in a cooperative Nash equilibrium with voluntary contributions (Besley and Coate, 1995).5
.3. Procedures
Sessions were organized near clients’ houses or businesses in eight different areas of Dar es Salaam, in venues where
redit groups typically meet with their loan ofﬁcers for weekly repayment. Clients were invited to come to one of the sessions
n their area, which were introduced as interactive seminars for a research project on health insurance. They could bring
long credit group members. Random assignment to groups occurred at the individual level, so clients did not necessarily
lay with group members that they brought along. Every treatment was played at most once in an area and treatments were
ot announced during mobilization. Clients knew that only members of their MFI  would participate and that the research
as independent of the MFI, to assure conﬁdentiality.
A session lasted approximately 3 hours. First, assistants administered a short questionnaire on participants’ socio-
emographic, health and credit group characteristics. Three games were then played: (1) the ﬁrst game with both insurance
nd lending at the individual level, and an insurance premium of 12,500 TZS – including a practice round; (2) the same game
ut with a higher insurance premium of 17,500 TZS; and (3) the main game with joint liability, eliciting demand for either
roup or individual insurance with or without prior communication – also preceded by a practice round.6 Communication
as not introduced until the start of this main game, to ensure comparability of the ﬁrst two games. Assistants tape-recorded,
ranscribed and translated communication to English.
Similar to Cassar et al. (2007), participants were told they would play the game for a large, unknown number of rounds to
void a last round effect. Thus, participants only knew they would play as long as they repaid their loan; they did not know
hen the game would end. The experimenter announced an exogenous termination shock after the fourth round. From then
n, one group member tossed a die after every round. If the die landed at 1, the game ended for the group.7 Or, as stated by
ne of the participants (based on transcripts from communication during the games):
“I congratulate our sister for throwing another number than one, which enables us to play this round. That means the game
goes on and our earnings increase as well.”
t the start of the experiment, every participant received a symbol that she was asked not to reveal to others. Participants
earned about the insurance decision and health status of the other symbols in their group, i.e. their peers. This information
as revealed after every round, including the ﬁrst and second game with individual liability. Hence, participants knew the
ypes of their peers and could update their beliefs about peers’ actions. The identiﬁcation through anonymous symbols
imited the effects of future outside interactions on behavior in the game.8
Participants received their earnings after every round and stored these in lock-boxes until the end of the session. For the
ain game, this incentive mechanism has two attractive properties. First, our analyses mainly focus on the ﬁrst round, in
hich paying all rounds sequentially has good behavioral properties (Cox et al., 2015). We  focus on the ﬁrst round because
articipants played the same introductory games independent of treatment, ruling out an impact of treatment on prior
xperiences. Second, paying all rounds allowed analyzing free-riding over time and made the game easier to comprehend,
ecause participants experienced the ﬁnancial implications of their decisions after every round.9
5 If peers jointly contribute the required contribution minus an amount cit , and if the continuation value is higher than the utility from consuming cit ,
hen  a participants’ best response is to contribute the remaining cit required to cover delinquents. Lower contributions result in group default and prevent
ontinuation to the next loan cycle. By symmetry, contributing cit is an equilibrium strategy for every client.
6 See Appendix C in the online supplement for an English translation of the Kiswahili instructions.
7 Because of time constraints, clients played at most six rounds, but they were not informed of this beforehand.
8 In both communication and non-communication treatments, all ﬁve group members were seated near each other in front of the scoring board for their
roup  (in two rows of two and three group members, respectively). During group discussions in the communication treatments, the group members in
he  ﬁrst row turned their seats around in order to face group members in the second row. Differences between communication and non-communication
reatments may  hence be due in part to an increased sense of closeness, as participants could better look at each other.
9 Randomly selecting one round for payment would only be valid under the independence axiom (Harrison and Swarthout, 2014; Cox et al., 2015), and
nly  if we had aimed to abstract from time dynamics.
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Clients received a show-up fee of 7000 TZS (4.67 USD) and could earn in addition up to 27,500 TZS (18.35 USD). For
every 10,000 earned in the game, a participant received 1000 TZS. The average participant earned 18,000 TZS (12 USD),
approximately 2.5 days of business proﬁt.
3. Theoretical predictions
3.1. Hypotheses
To analyze whether individual insurance take-up is hampered by free-riding in this game, we analyze whether partic-
ipants who prefer full enrollment under group insurance strategically forgo individual insurance in a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. Our hypotheses start from the assumption that participants are risk neutral or risk averse.10 Further, we  assume
that clients optimize expected utility, taking into account beliefs about the current and future number of insured peers and
information on insurance decisions in the past. They have complete information on pay-offs and types, as well as perfect
recall of peers’ past health shocks and insurance decisions.
Appendix B (see the online supplement) sets up a general theoretical framework, nesting the implemented game as a
special case. Rules are the same as discussed above, but we  vary the health shock probability, health expenditures as a
share of revenue before loan repayment, the loan and group size, and the number of delinquents for which a group can
contribute.11 Under reasonable assumptions, the theoretical results presented here are robust to a wide range of variations
in these parameters. For brevity, we discuss the intuition behind these results here, and refer to the appendix for the formal
propositions and proofs behind our hypotheses.
Experimental payoffs were such that full group enrollment enhances welfare for any risk neutral or risk averse participant.
The group insurance treatment enables us to verify this assumption. High demand for group insurance implies that full
group enrollment optimizes group welfare. Since clients cannot free-ride on contributions from insured peers by opting out
of insurance individually, they will commit to the social optimum. Appendix B formalizes this claim.
We next show that individual insurance is subject to free-riding. Denote dIIt (i) as participant i’s best response to the
individual insurance decision in period t if she believes that all peers will enroll in individual insurance, where i represents
the individual’s level of risk aversion. Free-riding occurs when a participant with such beliefs is willing to join group insurance,
dGIt (i) = 1, but does not take individual insurance, dIIt (i) = 0. Because the participant believes that all peers will enroll, her
decision is not confounded by uncertainty about peers’ decisions or coordination failures in individual insurance.
To see under which conditions we predict free-riding, assume that a participant believes her four peers will all enroll. In
that case, she will not have to contribute for her (insured) peers and because they will contribute in case she cannot repay
herself, the group continues to the next loan cycle irrespective of her insurance decision. Her decision hence reduces to a
one-time trade-off between the risk-free insurance option, yielding 10,000, and a gamble with higher but uncertain earnings
(22,500 with a probability of 4/5). We  deﬁne a threshold level of risk aversion such that dIIt (i) = 1 if i ≥ *, and dIIt (i) = 0 if
i < *, where * is deﬁned implicitly by the following equation:
U(10, 000; ∗) = 0.8U(22, 500; ∗) (1)
Eq. (1) deﬁnes two types of clients: more risk averse clients with a risk aversion coefﬁcient i ≥ * (which we call the ‘high RA’
type, H), who weakly prefer to enroll in a context without joint liability or dynamic incentives; and less risk averse clients
with i < * (the ‘low RA’ type, L), who prefer not to enroll in this context. Note that the low RA type forgoes insurance that is
actuarially fair from the provider’s perspective, despite the concavity of her utility. This is because uninsured clients do not
fully repay their share of the loan when falling ill, and one-time earnings with insurance, 10,000, are strictly below expected
earnings without insurance, 0.8*22,500.12
The deﬁnition of these client types yields two testable predictions for clients with only high RA peers. On the one hand,
high RA clients whose peers all enroll are not tempted to free-ride under individual insurance. Hence, if all members of a
group are of the high RA type and believe that their peers will enroll, they will all enroll and commit to the social optimum.
Assuming that clients know they have only high RA peers, and that they coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium in which
10 This assumption is consistent with experimental evidence from East-Africa that the vast majority of individuals act in a risk averse manner (Harrison
et  al., 2010). If we were to relax this assumption, demand for both group and individual insurance would be lower. In the absence of dynamic incentives,
insurance is not welfare-improving for a risk-seeking individual. There would hence be no social dilemma.
11 We selected the experimental parameters as follows. First, the actuarially fair insurance premium had to be of the same order of magnitude as the
insurance premium for a policy that the MFI  was contemplating to introduce, ﬁxing the insurance premium at 12,500. Second, a health shock probability
of  1/5 made the health risk salient (on average, one group member would be ill per round), and determined catastrophic health expenditures at 12,500/0.2
=  62,500. To simplify the experimental instructions, these health expenditures fully absorbed earnings before loan repayment, ﬁxing earnings before loan
repayment at 62,500 as well. Finally, we imposed the condition that groups with 5 clients could always repay as long as at most 1 group member opted
out  of insurance. Thus, 4 insured clients needed sufﬁcient earnings to contribute for 1 uninsured client. This restricted earnings net of loan repayment, e,
to  4(e−12,500) ≥ 62,500−e. In other words, earnings net of loan repayment had to be at least 22,500 with a loan equal to at most 40,000.
12 Insurance is hence not actuarially fair from a client perspective. Because of the limited liability, delinquency is an externality either for the jointly liable
group  or the microﬁnance institution. If health expenditures were not catastrophic, i.e. at most 22,500 TZS instead of 62,500 TZS, the client could repay her
loan  also when ill and would not need support from peers to repay her loan. In that case, insurance take-up would not be subject to a social dilemma.
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Demand for group vs. individual insurance: dGIt (i) − dIIt (i).
High RA (H) Low RA (L)
t
h
H
A
c
p
t
H
i
w
R
r
d
i
s
a
m
ﬁ
p
g
e
p
a
s
t
f
i
k
f
p
d
f
3
l
cOnly high RA peers 0 (H1) + (H2)
At  least one low RA peer ? ?
he best response is dIIt (H) = 1, we predict equal demand for group insurance and individual insurance in groups with only
igh RA members:
YPOTHESIS 1. For client H with H ≥ * and only high RA peers,
E
[
dGIt (H) − dIIt (H)
]
= 0.
 rejection of this hypothesis in early loan cycles only, when clients may  be uncertain about peers’ actions, could imply a
oordination problem.
On the other hand, low RA clients with only high RA peers will forgo individual insurance if they believe that all their
eers will enroll, even if they prefer to join when offered group insurance. The second hypothesis tested in the experiment is
herefore that low RA clients with only high RA peers have higher demand for group insurance than for individual insurance:
YPOTHESIS 2. For client L with L < * and only high RA peers,
E
[
dGIt (L) − dIIt (L)
]
> 0.
These two hypotheses focus on clients with only high RA peers. We will also compare the demand for group and individual
nsurance within the remaining two subsamples, as depicted in the table below.
First, we focus on high RA clients with at least one low RA peer in the group. Appendix B.6 shows that high RA clients’
illingness to join individual insurance decreases in the number of uninsured peers. The least risk-averse client of the high
A type will not enroll when she believes that at least one group member will free-ride. As more peers free-ride, increasingly
isk-averse participants will decide not to enroll either.
Second, since groups may  in practice sort on risk attitudes (Genicot and Ray, 2003; Attanasio et al., 2012), we  will analyze
ecisions of low RA clients with at least one other low RA peer. Low RA clients with uninsured peers may  enroll in individual
nsurance in order to reduce the group default risk (Appendix B.6). They will do so if and only if they value continuation
ufﬁciently. Again, this is an empirical question. We  will therefore examine whether the difference in demand between group
nd individual insurance is more pronounced in groups with a larger fraction of low RA members. In that case, assortative
atching would exacerbate free-riding among low RA clients.
Our hypotheses do not take into account the implications of repeated interactions, norms and peer pressure. In a micro-
nance setting, group membership is a long-term commitment. Groups borrow often increasing amounts conditional on
rior loan repayments, and switching groups is costly. Clients will hence face repeated insurance decisions within the same
roup, and they might sanction free-riders by staying uninsured themselves in future loan cycles.13 Conventional laboratory
xperiments indeed ﬁnd that dynamic interactions enhance cooperation (Bó, 2005). Appendix B.6 shows that given the
arameters used in our experiment, the strategy to stay uninsured in future loan cycles as a sanction on free-riding is both
 credible and an effective threat.
Further, microﬁnance institutions teach their clients to be ‘good borrowers’ (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010), which may
hape norms to enroll in insurance, and microﬁnance clients meet regularly to repay their loans. Communication during
hese meetings may  enhance cooperation (Sally, 1995), for instance because individuals perceive a cost of lying or feel guilt
rom blame (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Vanberg, 2008; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2011). This result will be strongest
n groups with close social ties (Cassar et al., 2007). Norms, communication and social ties may  shape beliefs and increase
nowledge of peers’ types and strategies. This could enhance coordination but also induce free-riding. Giné et al. (2010)
or instance show that revealing types through communication increases the proportion of clients choosing risky business
rojects.
We therefore vary the intensity of social interactions by varying whether it is possible to communicate prior to insurance
ecisions. In addition, we will explore exogenous variation in whether a participant is assigned to a group with members
rom her real-life microcredit group.
.2. Classiﬁcation of risk typesEmpirically, we classify participants’ risk types according to their choices in the introductory games. In the second and
ast round of the ﬁrst introductory game, dynamic incentives were absent because the game would end for all participants,
13 Alternatively, clients could exert direct social pressure. Fehr and Gächter (2000) show that individuals are willing to punish their peers even if this is
ostly.  We allow for retaliation through future decisions. Immediate sanctions are left for future research.
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irrespective of their ability to repay. Hence, participants faced a one-time trade-off between enrolling and receiving lower
risk-free earnings of 10,000 versus not enrolling and receiving higher but risky earnings of 22,500 with probability 4/5 (see
the left-hand side of Panel (b), Fig. 1). We  classify a participant as the high RA type, i ≥ *, if and only if she chose the risk-free
option in this one-time trade-off with individual insurance and individual liability.14 Note that this matches the trade-off
faced by participants in the main game with individual insurance and joint liability if they believed that all peers would
enroll, i.e. Eq. (1).
Our classiﬁcation into risk aversion types hence directly follows from the theoretical predictions. Because there was  no
joint liability in the introductory games, our measure reﬂects a willingness to take risks with borrowed money rather than
social preferences or beliefs about peers’ decisions. This classiﬁcation was not separated from a certainty or framing effect,
but the ﬁrst-game decision is sufﬁcient to separate the two theoretical client types, i.e. high RA and low RA clients, for whom
theory predicts qualitatively different behavior in a context of joint liability and dynamic incentives. Columns (3) and (4)
in Appendix Table A2 (see the online supplement) show that delinquency and contribution variables in Panel C are not
signiﬁcant predictors of our classiﬁcation as the low RA type. This suggests that our classiﬁcation is uncorrelated with social
preferences or ‘good borrower behavior’, and rather measures preferences towards risk in private earnings.15
We  classify 25.6 percent of the participants as the low RA type, and 74.4 percent as the high RA type, suggesting relatively
risk averse decisions compared to those in conventional risk lotteries.16 Framing the lottery as an insurance decision may
have induced loss-averse behavior or a preference for certainty. Out-of-sample predictions of our risk classiﬁcation in the
subject pool suggest that the percentage of clients classiﬁed as the low RA type is slightly higher, 30.7 percent, in the target
group (Appendix Table A1 in the online supplement). The experiment may  have attracted more risk averse individuals.
Further, the classiﬁcation builds on second-round decisions. First-round health shocks may  have induced more risk averse
behavior but our results are robust to alternative classiﬁcations that are not inﬂuenced by past health.
4. Results
This section presents the experimental ﬁndings. The main outcome of interest is a participant’s willingness to join insur-
ance – henceforth called demand. Under group insurance, demand is derived from the individual votes. These votes reveal
whether participants have a preference for full over zero enrollment when there are no opportunities to free-ride. The
experiment tests whether demand is lower in the individual insurance sessions.
We will ﬁrst compare average demand for group versus individual insurance in the ﬁrst round. This is followed by a
model that distinguishes between clients with and without low RA peers. These analyses directly test the two theoretical
hypotheses. Next, we explore the effects of communication and social ties. The section concludes with an analyses of decisions
and earnings over time.
4.1. Main results
We  start with a non-parametric analysis, treating every session as one observation and using an exact one-sided
Mann–Whitney test to examine whether individual insurance sessions rank lower in terms of average demand compared to
group insurance sessions. Fig. 2 presents the demand for health insurance in the ﬁrst round. The ﬁgure shows the percentage
of participants in each session willing to join group insurance (the circles on the left-hand side) or individual insurance (the
squares on the right-hand side). Black and grey symbols represent sessions without and with communication, respectively.
The sessions are ranked by the proportion of participants willing to join.
Panel (a) shows demand among high RA participants. They are willing to join insurance in both treatments. Averaged over
sessions, 95.6 percent of participants vote for insurance in the group insurance treatment, and 91.6 percent of participants
are willing to join individual insurance. A one-sided Mann–Whitney test conﬁrms that these statistics do not signiﬁcantly
differ.
Panel (b) focuses on low RA participants. Demand is again high under group insurance. On average, 81.7 percent of low
RA participants vote for insurance in the ﬁrst round. Under individual insurance, the low RA type is signiﬁcantly less willing
to join, and only 47.4 percent takes insurance. These are large differences, and indeed, individual insurance sessions rank
signiﬁcantly lower than group insurance sessions (p < 0.01).
14 In the ﬁrst introductory game, 4.5% of participants could not repay their loan in the ﬁrst round because they were uninsured and fell ill. These
participants did not play a second round and we assume they would have forgone insurance also in the second round if they had not experienced a health
shock. Consistent with this assumption, demand does not increase from the ﬁrst to the second round among participants who do not experience health
shocks in the ﬁrst round (demand among these participants was  78.5% and 76.1% in the ﬁrst and second round, respectively).
15 A comparison of our classiﬁcation with standard risk aversion measures from Binswanger or Holt and Laury lotteries would have been interesting, but
is  not essential for the interpretation of our ﬁndings. Therefore, we  decided not to overburden participants in terms of time investment and concentration
by  playing additional lotteries.
16 Appendix Table A3 (see the online supplement) shows that the risk types were well-balanced between group insurance versus individual insurance
(Panel D). For low RA participants, the number of low RA peers was  lower under individual insurance than under group insurance. We will control for the
number of low RA peers in our regression analyses.
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In order to identify free-riding, the main hypotheses apply to clients who believe that all peers will enroll. For clients
ho believe that some peers may  not enroll, suboptimal demand for individual insurance can also be due to coordination
ailures or be a best response to the fear that others will free-ride. We  did not elicit incentivized beliefs, as this could trigger
articipants to act on such beliefs in future rounds. Instead, we  proxy the belief that some group members will free-ride by
ither the number of low RA peers or the number of peers unwilling to join in the practice round of the main game.17 Past
hoices of peers were presented saliently, and inevitably will have inﬂuenced beliefs.
Table 1 separates the effect of individual insurance for clients who believe all peers will enroll from the effect for clients
ho expect to have free-riding peers, where beliefs are proxied as described above. Speciﬁcally, the table estimates a linear
robability model for demand dis, indicating whether client i in session s is willing to join insurance in the ﬁrst round. The
stimating equation is:
dis =  ˛ + ˇII IIs + ˇLLis + ˇII∗LIIs × Lis + εis, (2)
here IIs is a dummy  variable for individual insurance; Lis proxies the number of peers believed not to enroll; IIs × Lis is the
nteraction of individual insurance with this proxy; and εis ⊥ IIs is an individual-speciﬁc residual.
The table presents the estimated coefﬁcients, their standard errors clustered at the session level, and the one-sided t-
ercentile in a clustered wild bootstrap using Rademacher weights to test whether a coefﬁcient is strictly below or above
ero. Columns (1) and (5) estimate a restricted model in which we proxy the expected number of peers unwilling to join
17 These two proxies are closely correlated. In the practice round, demand for individual insurance was 43.5 percentage points higher among participants
ith  high instead of low risk aversion.
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Table  1
Willingness to join insurance in Round 1.
Participants with high risk aversion Participants with low risk aversion
Nr. low RA peers Lag nr. peers
unwilling to join
Nr. low RA peers Lag nr. peers
unwilling to join
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individual −0.029 −0.024 −0.009 −0.011 −0.377 −0.193 −0.348 −0.230
(0.030) (0.044) (0.030) (0.038) (0.094) (0.139) (0.093) (0.132)
p-Value 0.187 0.245 0.416 0.374 0.019** 0.075* 0.005*** 0.055*
Proxy expected # peers unwilling to join −0.034 −0.033 −0.055 −0.057 0.026 0.072 −0.093 −0.030
(0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.029) (0.043) (0.050) (0.053) (0.073)
p-Value 0.068* 0.106 0.036** 0.198 0.312 0.128 0.137 0.388
...  X Individual −0.005 0.003 −0.170 −0.134
(0.033) (0.037) (0.095) (0.106)
p-Value 0.455 0.483 0.160 0.188
R-squared 0.022 0.023 0.040 0.040 0.178 0.207 0.202 0.217
Mean  Group insurance 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.852
Observations 264 264 264 264 91 91 91 91
Notes: First line: Point estimate from linear probability model. Second line: standard errors clustered by session. Third line: One-sided t-percentile based
on  a wild cluster bootstrap with 999 replications. Dependent variable: Willingness to join insurance in Round 1. Appendix Table A4 presents the same
model controlling for past health shocks and participant characteristics. Appendix Table A5 presents Columns (3) and (8) using alternative classiﬁcations
of  risk aversion types.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
by the number of low RA peers. Results are similar to the non-parametric session-level estimates. For high RA participants,
individual insurance reduces demand by 2.9 percentage points compared to group insurance in Column (1). This difference
is small and statistically insigniﬁcant. For low RA participants, individual insurance reduces demand signiﬁcantly by 37.7
percentage points in Column (5). Columns (3) and (7) proxy beliefs by the number of peers unwilling to join in the practice
round. This yields very similar results.
The remaining columns include an interaction term for individual insurance and beliefs. These interaction terms are zero
for participants without low RA (or unwilling) peers, so that ˇII now captures the difference in demand for group versus
individual insurance among participants with only high RA (or willing) peers. A negative estimate indicates that the client is
willing to join group insurance, but not individual insurance. She can reasonably believe that all her peers will enroll, such
that this can be interpreted as evidence of free-riding. If the coefﬁcient on the interaction term is negative, ˇII*L < 0, this could
also imply that clients forgo insurance because they fear their low RA peers will not enroll either, yielding further evidence
of a social dilemma but not necessarily of free-riding.
Columns (2) and (4) in Table 1 estimate Eq. (2) for high RA participants. Individual insurance reduces demand by on
average 2.4 and 1.1 percentage points for participants with only high RA peers and participants whose peers were all
willing to join in the practice round, respectively. These estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant, consistent with Hypothesis
1. Further, the interaction effect between individual insurance and the proxies for beliefs is negligible.18 The vast majority
of high RA participants with low RA peers does not anticipate or reciprocate free-riding by staying uninsured themselves.
This warrants the assumption underlying Hypothesis 2 that low RA clients believe all high RA peers will enroll.
The estimates in Columns (6) and (8) show that the demand for individual insurance of low RA participants with only
high RA peers is 19.3 percentage points lower than for group insurance (p < 0.10), and this estimate is 23.0 percentage
points (p < 0.10) for low RA participants whose peers were all willing to join in the practice round. While a non-negligible
proportion of low RA clients decides to enroll in individual insurance, one-ﬁfth is free-riding in the ﬁrst round, providing
evidence of Hypothesis 2. Having low RA peers or peers unwilling to join in the practice round magniﬁes the social dilemma
among the low RA type. Every additional low RA (unwilling) peer increases the difference in demand between group and
individual insurance by 17.0 (13.4) percentage points. Thus, the inclination to free-ride appears larger when groups sort on
risk preferences.
Appendix Table A4 (see the online supplement) estimates a model including control variables, corresponding to the
restricted models in Table 1. These analyses control for observed characteristics that are correlated with demand for insur-
ance, including potential spillovers from the introductory games and health shocks in the practice round preceding the main
game. Consistent with an availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) and literature on enrollment in insurance after
experiencing an insurable event (Kunreuther, 1996; Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Zhang and Wang, 2008), past health shocks
increase take-up among low RA participants. Nonetheless, demand for individual insurance remains signiﬁcantly lower
18 We ﬁnd similar results when we replace the number of low RA peers in Equation (2) with a binary indicator for whether a client has (i) at least one low
RA  peer, or (ii) at least one peer who was unwilling to join in the practice round.
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Table  2
Effect of individual insurance on demand in Round 1 without and with social interaction
Participants with high risk aversion Participants with low risk aversion
Social interaction:
Communication
treatment
Social interaction:
With real credit group
member
Social interaction:
Communication
treatment
Social interaction:
With real credit group
member
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individual −0.038 −0.020 −0.034 −0.058 −0.395 −0.343 −0.376 −0.293
(0.03) (0.044) (0.03) (0.037) (0.09) (0.124) (0.091) (0.115)
p-Value 0.110 0.225 0.168 0.110 0.004*** 0.080* 0.007*** 0.033**
Social interaction −0.066 −0.051 0.012 −0.017 −0.131 −0.085 −0.137 −0.041
(0.029) (0.039) (0.031) (0.041) (0.088) (0.115) (0.093) (0.123)
p-Value 0.025** 0.087* 0.331 0.268 0.082* 0.177 0.058* 0.318
Individual × social interaction −0.033 0.068 −0.112 −0.218
(0.06) (0.062) (0.181) (0.186)
p-Value 0.289 0.136 0.327 0.139
R-squared 0.022 0.023 0.040 0.040 0.178 0.207 0.202 0.217
Mean  Group insurance 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.852
Observations 264 264 264 264 91 91 91 91
Notes: First line: Point estimate from linear probability model. Second line: standard errors clustered by session. Third line: One-sided t-percentile based
on  a wild cluster bootstrap with 999 replications. Dependent variable: Willingness to join insurance in Round 1. Appendix Table A7 presents the same
model for Rounds 2–4.
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ompared to demand for group insurance. In other words, our main ﬁndings cannot be explained by an availability bias or
otential spillovers from the introductory games.
Appendix Table A5 in the online supplement analyzes sensitivity of our results to how we classify participants’ willingness
o take risks with borrowed money. Independent of the classiﬁcation used, we  obtain very similar results.
In sum, in the presence of joint liability, we ﬁnd a large difference in demand between group and individual insurance
or low RA clients. A signiﬁcant share forgoes individual but not group insurance even when it is reasonable to believe that
ll peers will enroll, consistent with the free-riding hypothesis. Demand among high RA clients is high in both treatments
nd is not affected by either coordination failures or free-riding.
.2. Social interaction
Social ties and communication may  enhance cooperation in microcredit groups (Cassar et al., 2007). It can create focal
oints, reinforce social norms and further reveal types, in particular in the ﬁrst round of the game when participants have
ot yet observed peers’ incentivized decisions in the joint liability game. Table 2 therefore investigates whether suboptimal
emand for individual insurance persists in the presence of social interaction, exploiting exogenous variation in whether
articipants could communicate as well as the random assignment to peers of their real-life credit group.
Columns (1), (2) and (5), (6) estimate the effect of individual insurance in the ﬁrst round separately for treatments without
nd with communication, based on the following equation:
dis =  ˛ + ˇII IIs + ˇCCs + ˇII∗C IIs ∗ Cs + εis (3)
here Cs indicates sessions in the communication treatment, and IIs × Cs its interaction with individual insurance.
Columns (1) and (5) present the coefﬁcient on individual insurance, ˇII, when estimating this equation with communi-
ation Cs as a control variable, but without interaction term, ˇII*C = 0. Estimates are very similar in size and signiﬁcance to
he respective coefﬁcients in Table 1, which does not include communication as a control variable.
Columns (2) and (6) estimate Eq. (3), presenting the effect of individual insurance without and with communication,
espectively, i.e. ˆˇ II and ˆˇ II + ˆˇ II∗C . Column (2) focuses on high RA participants and Column (6) on the low RA type. Individual
nsurance affects demand only for low RA participants, independent of whether participants are able to communicate.
oreover, the results suggest that communication within groups increases the temptation to free-ride among low RA types.
Why  does suboptimal demand among low RA participants persist when groups are allowed to verbally interact? Trans-
ripts of recorded communication suggest that participants were aware of free-riding:
“We  all agreed from the start that we take health insurance but one person betrayed us. It is nothing but greed. He fell sick
and now we have to contribute for him.”o systematically investigate the role of communication in insurance take-up, we conducted a content analysis of verbal
nteractions in the communication treatment. We  assigned statements, i.e. single quotes of group members, to one of four
ategories that reﬂect mechanisms through which communication may  have affected behavior (cf. Hennig-Schmidt et al.,
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Fig. 3. First-round communication by topic and demand for insurance. Notes: The ﬁgure presents by category the average % of statements in a group’s
ﬁrst-round communication that is classiﬁed as that category. In order of presentation, these categories represent (1) discussions on how the game relates to
real-life health insurance; (2) statements on joint liability, norms of solidarity and externalities of decisions for peers; (3) discussions on (private) beneﬁts
of  insurance as ﬁnancial protection against shocks; and (4) intentions to take health insurance.
2008): signaling types, creating focal points, peer pressure, and linkages to real-life health insurance. Other quotes jointly
amount to less than 5% of communication and are left out of the analysis.
We  focus on communication prior to the ﬁrst round of the main game, and analyze the percentage of statements by
category within a group. Fig. 3 categorizes statements under group insurance (Panel A) and individual insurance (Panel B).
In both panels, the ﬁrst (dark) bar for each category includes all groups independent of behavior. Groups were substantially
more likely to signal intentions when offered group insurance – they mainly discussed whether to vote for insurance.
Groups offered individual insurance were more likely to create focal points, highlighting an individual’s beneﬁts from having
insurance. Peer pressure (invoking social norms, discussing joint liability) was  equally common in the two treatments.
Communication may  have been inﬂuenced by past behavior. Gray bars present the percentage of statements in each
category for groups with at least one member unwilling to join in the practice round. In both treatments, such groups
focused less on linkages with real-life insurance than the average group. Instead, they were more likely to signal their
willingness to join and – only under individual insurance – to create focal points.
The white bar analyzes how communication content was related to subsequent enrollment, summarizing content for
groups with at least one member unwilling to join after the ﬁrst communication round. Under group insurance, the four
groups unable to reach full enrollment were substantially less likely to signal own  intentions and focused more on joint
liability (classiﬁed as peer pressure) compared to successful groups. Discussing joint liability may  have highlighted the
possibility to share risk instead of purchasing welfare-improving insurance. This negative effect of communication was
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 temporary phenomenon: in later rounds, communication no longer reduced demand for group insurance, but in fact
ncreased demand among low RA participants (see Appendix Table A7 in the online supplement).
Groups offered individual insurance were more likely to face subsequent free-riding when signaling intentions instead
f exerting peer pressure. The emphasis on good intentions combined with the lack of peer pressure may  in fact have rein-
orced the belief that it was possible to free-ride at little cost. Further, independent of content, the extent of communication
s associated with enhanced cooperation. The average number of statements in the ﬁrst round is 8.2 in groups with subse-
uent full enrollment but only 5.6 in groups with a subsequent free-rider. This is in line with e.g. Brosig et al. (2003), who
nd signiﬁcant positive effects of face-to-face communication on cooperative behavior in a standard public goods game.
pparently, discussions did not sufﬁciently move beyond signaling intentions. Communicating more extensively, and in
articular expressing social norms or exerting peer pressure, could have helped reduce free-riding.
An alternative approach to investigate the role of social interactions exploits the random assignment of participants to
redit groups in the game. This introduces exogenous variation in whether a participant knows her peers from her real
icrocredit group, and allows us to test whether individual insurance also reduces demand in the presence of close social
ies.
Columns (3), (4) and (7), (8) of Table 2 estimate Eq. (3), using social ties instead of communication as a proxy for social
nteractions. Individual insurance reduces demand among the low RA type but not the high RA type also in the presence
f pre-existing social ties. This suggests that individuals with a temptation to free-ride are not easily deterred by norms of
olidarity towards their peers, even if they know them personally.
.3. Decisions and earnings over time
The previous sections focused on demand in the ﬁrst round of the game in order to test our hypotheses in the absence
f time dynamics. This section investigates decisions and earnings over time. As shown in Appendix Fig. A2 Panel (a) in
he online supplement, the demand for individual insurance of high RA participants drops slightly below group insurance
fter the ﬁrst round, but this is statistically insigniﬁcant. By contrast, demand among low RA participants in Panel (b) ranks
igniﬁcantly lower in sessions with individual compared to group insurance throughout the game.
Appendix Table A6 (see the online supplement) estimates Equation (2) for Rounds 2–4, when participants only knew
hey would play the game for a large number of rounds. We  control for lag earnings, lag health shocks and round effects.
lthough high RA participants slightly reduce their demand for individual insurance in later rounds, the vast majority stays
nrolled in individual insurance over time, irrespective of whether they have free-riding or low RA peers. In contrast, the
ifference in demand between individual and group insurance remains highly pronounced for the low RA type. Consistent
ith the free-riding hypothesis, a substantial proportion of low RA clients opts out of individual insurance throughout the
ame, even when all peers consistently enroll.19
A ﬁnal analysis simulates earnings in the ﬁrst four rounds using the estimated average demand for group insurance and
igniﬁcant differences with individual insurance from Table 1 (for round 1) and Appendix Table A6 (for rounds 2–4). Appendix
ig. A3 draws simulated earnings under group versus individual insurance as a share of earnings under mandatory enrollment
 the baseline case (see the online supplement). The left-hand side assumes that low RA clients are randomly distributed
ver groups, i.e. there is no sorting on risk preferences. The right-hand side presents earnings assuming assortative matching
n risk types.
Mixed groups offer an opportunity for low RA types to free-ride on their high RA peers. As a result, low RA earnings are
igher under individual than group insurance. High RA clients in turn earn most under group insurance, in which they do
ot need to contribute as often for free-riding low RA peers. When groups match on risk types, low RA types are grouped
ith other potential free-riders, reducing the beneﬁts they can reap from staying uninsured. This substantially reduces their
arnings under individual insurance. High RA clients again fare best when offered group insurance, because they are slightly
ess likely to be fully insured when offered individual insurance. Hence, total earnings are maximized under group insurance,
specially when individuals sort on risk preferences.
To conclude, we ﬁnd substantial evidence of the free-riding hypothesis among low RA participants, both in the ﬁrst and
n later rounds of the game. Demand for group insurance is high, but a substantial portion of low RA participants forgoes
ndividual insurance at the expense of their peers, which reduces total earnings over time.
. ConclusionMicroﬁnance institutions (MFIs) often use group-based lending to reduce default rates. Although risk-pooling in micro-
redit groups provides insurance for health expenditures, such insurance is incomplete since the group does not share
isk beyond repayment of the loan. This offers scope for formal insurance to increase group welfare. However, demand for
19 In analogy to Table 2 for demand in the ﬁrst round, Appendix Table A7 (see the online supplement) estimates the effect of individual insurance without
nd  with communication, and without and with social ties, for rounds 2–4. The regressions control for lag health shocks, earnings and round ﬁxed effects.
e  ﬁnd a similar pattern as in Table 2, with the exception that individual insurance slightly reduces demand among high RA participants in later rounds,
nd  that social interactions increase demand for group insurance.
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affordable micro health insurance is often low. This study provided and tested an explanation for low enrollment rates, using
a framed ﬁeld experiment with MFI  clients in Tanzania.
The experiment elicited demand for insurance offered at the individual versus group level and tested whether the indi-
vidual insurance decision in jointly liable credit groups entails a social dilemma. In theory, less risk averse clients forgo
individual insurance and free-ride on peers’ contributions in case of health shocks, even when the group is better off if all
members enroll. Group insurance precludes these clients from free-riding and raises demand for insurance to optimal levels.
The experiment yielded substantial evidence of free-riding. Early in the game, 85.2 percent of less risk averse participants
were willing to join group insurance, but only 46.0 percent joined individual insurance. In contrast, more risk averse clients
coordinated on the social optimum, despite the non-cooperative behavior of their uninsured peers.
As such, this experiment yields different ﬁndings than most conventional public goods games played with student popu-
lations in the laboratory. Speciﬁcally, high RA participants cooperated unconditionally and did not sanction their free-riding
peers. The tolerance towards free-riders diverges from the conditional cooperation observed even in the last round of con-
ventional public goods games. Sanctioning free-riders by not taking insurance is perhaps too costly for more risk averse
participants. On the other hand, a substantial number of low RA members cooperated even though free-riding was  not
sanctioned. A question for future research is whether this may  be due to social norms of solidarity among microﬁnance
clients.
The results suggest that the choice to offer insurance at the individual or group level should reach beyond administrative
considerations or concerns about adverse selection. Because members of jointly liable credit groups share risk, strategic
behavior can be an important determinant of their demand for microinsurance. As a contractual innovation, group insurance
eliminates the opportunity to free-ride on peers, and increases the willingness to join insurance.
The games resembled the real world of our participants as closely as possible. Nonetheless, demand for insurance in
jointly liable credit groups depends on more factors than can be studied simultaneously in a game. First, we abstracted from
savings as a self-insurance mechanism. In the extreme case that self-insurance can cover any health risk, actuarially fair
insurance will not be welfare-enhancing because clients can self-insure at a similar cost. However, savings will rarely be
sufﬁcient to fully eliminate catastrophic health risk. As long as self-insurance is insufﬁcient to fully smooth consumption,
formal insurance can be welfare-enhancing, leading to high demand under group insurance. By contrast, under individual
insurance, less risk averse clients may  still prefer relying on the support from peers rather than saving for own  health
expenditures or enrolling in insurance, leaving the social dilemma intact.
Second, combining insurance and loans may  affect the demand for credit itself. On the one hand, insurance may reduce
demand for credit when clients see no value of having insurance (Banerjee et al., 2014). On the other hand, when insurance
provides extra value, demand for credit will increase (Leatherman et al., 2012). Further, by reducing the default risk, bundling
insurance and loans can help reduce interest rates, and enhance investments and technology adoption (Giné and Yang, 2009),
thereby improving households’ productivity and demand for future loans. The introduction of insurance may  also affect
optimal group composition, for instance when insurance induces sorting on preferences for formal insurance versus social
risk-sharing. While microinsurance schemes are currently rolled out to existing microcredit clients who face high switching
costs, access to insurance may  well affect the composition of new microﬁnance groups. These interactions between insurance,
credit, endogenous group formation and production decisions offer promising areas for further research.
Although we focus on health insurance, free-riding may  also reduce demand for other types of insurance. Moreover,
since social risk-sharing occurs beyond the credit group, the ﬁndings may  generalize to other pre-existing risk pools such as
migrant networks, informal savings groups or cooperatives. This is relevant for the design of a wide range of microinsurance
schemes.
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